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Abstract
A law issued to allocate reconstruction grants following the 2009 "Aquilano" earthquake has resulted in
a large and unanticipated discontinuity across municipalities with comparable damages. Using diﬀ-in-diﬀ
analysis we estimate the "local spending" and the "local tax" multipliers - according to the composition of
the stimulus - controlling for the negative supply shock generated by the event. The stimulus prevented a
fall in economic activity and the multiplicative eﬀects of tax cuts are estimated much higher than those of
spending. Our results underline the importance of countercyclical fiscal interventions and suggest the most
eﬀective composition of such a stimulus.
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1. Introduction
The eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy - typically summarized by a number "the multiplier" - has been an
important driver of policy and academic debates in recent years. Although several contributions have provided
estimates of "the multiplier" using diﬀerent identification strategies, the literature is far from consensus.
While virtually all earlier contributions have focused on aggregate eﬀects, recent papers have shifted the
attention to the local dimension. As Acconcia et al. [1] point out, the shift is motivated not only by specific
policy questions - such as countering area-specific recessionary shocks - but also by the opportunity to address
econometric issues in identification: fiscal policy is highly endogenous to the business cycle and its eﬀects are
often anticipated by rational agents.
This paper contributes to the debate on the eﬀects of government interventions relying on a natural ex-
periment, the 2009 "Aquilano" earthquake that hit the Italian region of Abruzzo. Specifically, we estimate
the output eﬀect generated by the event, as a result of two combined shocks, the negative supply shock due
to the quake, and the positive demand shock driven by reconstruction grants to the region. Our empirical
strategy relies on the following two factors: (i) a quantified measure of damages reported by the 75,424 build-
ings classified after the quake, and (ii) the specific characteristics of the institutional arrangement of public
grants providing insurance to the municipalities aﬀected by the earthquake. With regard to the first factor,
in the aftermath of the earthquake specialists from the Civil Protection Department (CPD) and the National
Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV ) visited the epicentral area with the goal of surveying the
aﬀected buildings.1 Relying on the reported damages, we construct a synthetic index that captures the neg-
ative supply shock generated by the event at the micro-municipal level. With regard to the second factor, as
a complementary task the delegates assigned a synthetic number to the municipalities in the epicentral area
reflecting the overall severity of the damages. Following a well-established practice, the rankings were based
on the so-called Mercalli scale that classifies the destructive eﬀects of an earthquake on twelve notches, rang-
ing from "instrumental" (I) to "catastrophic" (XII).2 Once the list of aﬀected municipalities was delivered
1The Department of Civil Protection is a structure of the Prime Minister’s Oﬃce which coordinates and directs the national
service of civil protection. When a national emergency is declared, it coordinates the relief on the entire national territory. It
coordinates activities in response to natural disasters, catastrophes or other events which, due to their intensity and extent,
must be tackled using special means and powers. In this case, the council of ministers declares the "state of emergency" by
issuing a law by decree and identifies the actions to be undertaken to manage the event.
2Contrary to the well-known Richter scale (which quantifies the moment magnitude of an earthquake meaning the energy
2
to the national authorities, the central government enacted a law by decree establishing a qualifying Mercalli
threshold for reconstruction grants. This threshold, ex ante unknown to the delegates, was fixed at level
VI of the scale (the lowest level associated to marginal damages to civil structures) and resulted in a sharp
discontinuity in grants across ex ante identical neighbor municipalities. The assigned grants were then used
by the qualified municipalities for two purposes: to finance the increase of local spending directed towards
reconstruction activities and to compensate for the loss in local tax revenues due to the shock to the tax base
and the temporary suspension of tax payments in the most aﬀected regions.
Studying the 305 municipalities in the Abruzzo region over the period 2002 to 2011 (3,050 observations
in total) we estimate three things. First, we estimate the "reconstruction grants multiplier" - the elasticity
of local output to exogenous reconstruction grants allocated from the central government to the qualified
municipalities. Second, noticing that the discontinuity in local spending is identified at Mercalli VI as for
grants while the discontinuity in local tax revenues is at Mercalli VII (due to an exogenous reduction in
the local marginal tax rate which applied only to municipalities with severe damages), we estimate the
"local spending multiplier" net of marginal tax rebates around the Mercalli VI cutoﬀ and the the "local tax
multiplier" net of variations of the tax base around the Mercalli VII cutoﬀ. Finally, we estimate the output
loss generated by the negative supply shock due to the destruction of physical capital relying on our index
of damages.
In our econometric analysis we rely on two identification strategies based on a linear fixed-eﬀects panel
data model. In the first identification strategy, in order to address the grants endogeneity issue, we rely
on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach regressing output over the index of damages and the interaction
between a dummy which identifies the treatment and control groups (around the Mercalli VI cutoﬀ) and
the per capita grants. The second identification strategy addresses the possible endogeneity of damages
using an instrumental variable approach. As a strictly exogenous instrument we employ the distance of each
municipality from the epicenter which confirms the prior to be highly correlated with the recorded damages
and fully satisfies the exclusion restrictions criteria.
released by the event), the Mercalli scale classifies the destructive eﬀects of an earthquake. While every quake has only one
magnitude recorded at the epicenter, the destructive eﬀects (therefore the Mercalli ranks) vary greatly across municipalities
according to a large set of factors, including the distance from the epicenter or the ex ante vulnerability of buildings. See
AppendixC for details.
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In our findings, the direct eﬀect of the earthquake on output is unambiguously negative. Our instru-
mental variables analysis shows that, on impact, the output loss from the quake averages 3.7 percentage
points. Against the output eﬀects of the negative supply shock, we document positive multiplicative eﬀects
of reconstruction grants. The estimated "grants multiplier" is bounded between 0.14 and 0.36 according to
the model. Multiplying these elasticities by the magnitude of the fiscal shock, our results suggest that public
grants compensate the output fall (which is instead suﬀered by the control group) generated by the quake.
Therefore, although grants multipliers remain well below unity in all models, our results suggest that fol-
lowing seismic events reconstruction grants provide public insurance. Output in uninsured regions contracts
while it expands, although marginally, in qualified municipalities.3 Also, the "local spending multiplier" net
of marginal tax rebates is virtually identical to the "grants multiplier" signaling, as expected, that most
of the exogenous variations in grants financed reconstruction activities and translated into a sharp increase
of local spending. However, the "local tax multiplier" is well above unity with point estimate of 2.56 even
if this last estimate should be interpreted with caution given the restricted number of observations in the
corresponding treatment group (above Mercalli VII).
Our findings contribute to the literature assessing the eﬀectiveness of government interventions. A small
but dynamic literature has produced estimates on local output elasticities to exogenous fiscal shocks us-
ing diﬀerent instruments: dismissal of elected oﬃcials (Acconcia et al. [1]), census revisions (Serrato and
Wingender [11]), variations in stimulus outlays mandated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) of 2009 (Chodorow-Reich et al. [5]), or military buildups across US states (Nakamura and Steinsson
[9]). Close in spirit to our paper is a recent contribution by Corbi et al. [6] who rely on a discontinuity in
federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil to identify the causal eﬀect of fiscal policy on economic
growth. Our estimates are lower than those reported in the aforementioned contributions. While output
elasticity to fiscal shocks is predicted to be higher in downturns (Woodford [12]), the grants and spending
multipliers contained in this paper remain well below unity in all models, although the "local tax multipliers"
are estimated well above one. Yet the size of the grants acted as a public insurance scheme preventing a fall
in output. Our results underline the importance of countercyclical fiscal interventions after natural events
3Although Italy is one of the most seismic countries in the world, households and firms cannot insure against seismic risks
since no there is no private insurance market.
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and suggest the most eﬀective composition of such stimuli.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 2009 "Aquilano" earthquake, the
natural event at the heart of this study. Section 3 explains and discusses the empirical model. Section 4
describes the main features of our dataset. Section 5 discusses our main results. Section 6 is devoted to the
discussion of our set of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. Additional tables, charts, and complementary
results are reported in AppendixA to AppendixF.
2. The 2009 "Aquilano" earthquake
At 03:32 am on April 6th 2009 a 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit the southern part of Italy. The epicenter
was located 19.79 Kilometers to the west of "L’Aquila", the capital city of Abruzzo region.4 Three hundred
and nine people were killed and more than 1,500 were injured. The seismic event generated damages in
97 municipalities, 72 of which located in the province of L’Aquila. Following the declaration of the state
of emergency by the Council of Ministers, a team of specialists from the CPD and the INGV visited the
aﬀected regions to assess the severity and extension of the damages. The procedure lasted ten days and on
April 16th the list of aﬀected municipalities and the estimate of total damages was made publicly available
and sent to the central government.
During their mission the delegates had two separate tasks. First, they visited each building reporting
damages (or suspected so) and ranked them following the "AeDES international classification system" (Baggio
et al. [2]). This system categorizes civil structures after a seismic event on six levels ranging from "A" ("usable
building") to "F" ("unusable building and severe external risks").5 Table 1 shows the distribution of buildings
across levels of damages and figure 2 plots the map of damages across municipalities in the epicentral region.
Out of 75,424 buildings visited by the CPD and INGV specialists 55.2 percent were ranked at level "A",
16.5 percent "B", 3.4 percent "C", 1.9 percent "D", 20.4 percent "E" and the remaining 2.6 percent "F"
4Abruzzo is a southern region of Italy composed by 305 municipalities grouped in 4 provinces (L’Aquila, Chieti, Teramo, and
Pescara) for a total 1.3 million inhabitants. See figure F.11.
5The six categories are defined as follows: A: "usable building"; B: "usable building after short-term measures"; C: "partially
unusable building"; D: "temporary unusable building"; E: "unusable building"; F: "unusable building and severe external risks".
For details see Baggio et al. [2].
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Table 1: Percentage of buildings in each AeDES category.
Type of building
AeDES category Private Public Hospitals Barracks Schools Factories Overall
A 55.0 57.5 51.5 71.0 52.9 56.6 55.2
B 15.6 19.1 18.2 25.0 26.7 19.4 16.5
C 3.3 4.5 15.2 3.0 2.4 4.5 3.4
D 1.9 3.4 3.0 - 3.7 0.8 1.9
E 21.5 14.3 12.1 1.0 12.5 15.7 20.4
F 2.7 1.2 - - 1.8 3.0 2.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Civil Protection Department, Italian Ministry of Interior (http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it).
with no significant diﬀerences across types of buildings.
As a second task, the delegates assigned a number to the municipalities in the epicentral region according
to the severity of the damages.6 This number reflects a level of the so-called "Mercalli scale" which quantifies
the eﬀects of an earthquake on the Earth’s surface, humans, objects of nature, and man-made structures on
twelve notches ranging from I (’instrumental’) to XII (’catastrophic’).7 The definitions of the Mercalli levels
are reported in AppendixC, while figure 1 plots the map of the earthquake, highlighting each municipality
according to the Mercalli rank.8
6Because of the extension and severity of the damages in the epicentral region, the delegates did not distinguish between
Mercalli levels below V and assigned a 0 instead (not shown in the map).
7As an example we report the definition of level VI (Strong): “People: Felt by all. People and animals alarmed. Many run
outside. Diﬃculty experienced in walking steadily. Fittings: Objects fall from shelves. Pictures fall from walls. Some furniture
moved on smooth floors, some unsecured free-standing fireplaces moved. Glassware and crockery broken. Very unstable furniture
overturned. Small church and school bells ring. Appliances move on bench or table tops. Filing cabinets or "easy glide" drawers
may open (or shut). Structures: Slight damage to Buildings Type I. Some stucco or cement plaster falls. Windows Type I
broken. Damage to a few weak domestic chimneys, some may fall. Environment: Trees and bushes shake, or are heard to rustle.
Loose material may be dislodged from sloping ground, e.g. existing slides, talus slopes, shingle slides” (source: Mercalli scale).
8Out of 305 municipalities in Abruzzo, 177 were ranked below V, 79 at level V (including V-VI), 41 at level VI (including
VI-VII) and 8 at level VII or above. Table F.12 shows the distribution across provinces.
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Figure 1: Map of "Aquilano" earthquake.
Source: authors’ calculation on INGV data.
7
Figure 2: Map of classified damages according to AeDES classification system.
Note: The size of the pies reflects the absolute number of buildings (in brackets) classified in each municipality. Source: CPD database.
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On April 28th 2009 the central government enacted a law by decree ("Decreto Legge 28 Aprile 2009,
n.39") establishing a qualifying Mercalli threshold to receive reconstruction grants.9 The threshold, ex-ante
unknown to the delegates, was fixed at level VI, the lowest level associated to (marginal) structural damages
to civil structures (see AppendixC for details). The decision of the government - crucial for our identification
strategy - resulted in a sharp discontinuity around the cut-oﬀ, with 49 municipalities at the immediate right
(level VI and VI-VII) and 73 to the left (level V and V-VI). Figure 3 shows the discontinuity by plotting
total grants against the Mercalli scale. The average per capita grant to the left of the cut-oﬀ is 488.4 Euros
Figure 3: Discontinuity in grants.
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Source: authors’ calculation on Italian MInistry of Interior data.
while it increases to 2949.6 Euros per capita to the right. The cross-sectional standard deviation of grants
9For completeness we report the original text (in Italian) from the law by decree ("Decreto Legge" 28 Aprile 2009, n.39): “I
predetti provvedimenti hanno eﬀetto esclusivamente nei confronti dei comuni interessati dagli eventi sismici che hanno colpito la
regione Abruzzo a partire dal 6 aprile 2009 che, sulla base dei dati risultanti dai rilievi macrosismici eﬀettuati dal Dipartimento
della protezione civile, hanno risentito un’intensita’ MSC uguale o superiore al sesto grado”.
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is higher to the right-hand-side because the overall amount is proportional to the extension of the damages
- meaning the number of buildings damaged - which is not captured by the Mercalli scale (which instead
identifies the severity of the damages).10
The exogenous reconstruction grants were used by the qualified municipalities for two diﬀerent purposes.
On the one hand they financed post-disaster activities directed towards the reconstruction of public and
private buildings. On the other hand, they compensated municipal budges for losses in revenues due to
the suspension of local taxes. Figures F.9 and F.10 show the discontinuity in total expenditure (current
and capital) and total tax revenues across municipalities according to Mercalli ranks. There exists a sharp
discontinuity in local government expenditures at Mercalli VI which closely mimics the discontinuity in grants.
However, the discontinuity in tax revenues is observed at Mercalli VII rather then VI with 49 municipalities on
the immediate left of the cut-oﬀ (Mercalli VI and VI-VII) and 8 to the right (at or above Mercalli VII).11 The
fact that the discontinuities in grants, local spending and local tax revenues are identified at diﬀerent Mercalli
levels allows a neat identification of respectively the "grants multiplier", the "local spending multiplier" net
of marginal tax rebates and the "local tax multiplier" net of variations in the tax base.
3. The empirical model
In our study we aim to estimate the short-run multiplicative eﬀects of reconstruction grants on local
economic activity at the municipal level following the 2009 "Aquilano" seismic event. We present the empirical
model and our instrument in this section while we discuss our baseline results in section 5.
For each municipality i let yi,t denote the real per capita value added in year t, and Yi,t its rate of growth
defined as Yi,t = yi,t yi,t 1yi,t 1 . Also, let gi,t denote the real per capita value of grants received by municipality
i in year t from the central government, and Gi,t its growth rate as a ratio of lagged output, defined as
Gi,t =
gi,t gi,t 1
yi,t 1 . Following the recent literature (see for instance Barro and Redlick [3] or Acconcia et al.
10See figure F.7 for the correlation between Mercalli ranks and the index of damages.
11The discontinuity in tax revenues is generated by two shocks: a negative shock to the tax base (mainly buildings for the
property tax) and a shock to the marginal tax rate due to the suspension of tax payments in 2009 for municipalities reporting
severe damages.
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[1]) we estimate the grants multiplier relating the growth of per capita value added in municipality i (Yi,t),
to the correspondent change in per capita grants in the same municipality in the same year (Gi,t).12
Our empirical strategy is based on a linear fixed-eﬀect panel data model with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach relying on the identical ex-ante behavior across control and treatment groups identified around the
Mercalli VI cut-oﬀ. The empirical model is
Yi,t = ↵i +  t +  Interactioni,t +  Damagesi,t +  1Gi,t +  2Di,t + ✓
0
Xi,t + ⌘i,t, (1)
where ↵i is a municipal fixed-eﬀect,  t is a time trend, Di,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
for the municipalities belonging to the treatment group and 0 for the municipalities in the control group,
✓
0
is a vector of coeﬃcients, Xi,t is a set of control variables, and ⌘i,t is a disturbance term. As standard
in the literature, the variable Interactioni,t interacts Gi,t with Di,t, and the coeﬃcient   measures the
contemporaneous one-year grants multiplier, meaning the elasticity of local output to exogenous shocks
in grants. The selection criteria of the bandwidth around the discontinuity (figure 3) should satisfy the
crucial assumption of ex-ante similarity between the control and the treatment group. Following Imbens
and Kalyanaraman [8] we estimate the optimal bandwidth around the discontinuity in grants which suggests
to compare Mercalli V and V-VI ranked municipalities (control group) to Mercalli VI (treatment group).
Figure 4 plots the variable of interest (local output) across the two groups (in order to ensure consistency in
our estimates we also check the similarity of other observable characteristics, see table F.14 in AppendixD).
Before the event there exists a clear common trend but when the earthquake strikes output contracts less
for treated municipalities than for the rest. Also, the ex-ante behavior of grants is tested and found to be
identical across control and treatment group before the event.13
The variable Damagesi,t captures the negative supply shock generated by the earthquake and the coeﬃ-
cient   identifies the contemporaneous one-year output growth loss due to the destruction of physical capital.
12As a measure of grants we consider the sum of both, current and capital grants from central government given that regional
government did not provide any financial support for the reconstruction.
13We tested the ex-ante similarity of each variable of interest by regressing the variable on a set of yearly dummies and the
interaction between the year dummies and Di,t. The F-statistics on the interactions never reject the null hypothesis of similar
behavior across treatment and control groups. Specifically, the p-values of the F-test are the following: output (0.4941), grants
(0.9083), and local spending (0.3431).
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Figure 4: Per capita GDP (2004 = 100).
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Source: authors’ calculation on European Commission data.
Our measure of capital stock loss is a weighted average of the number of buildings categorized in each AeDES
level expressed as a share of the population. Formally
Damagesi,t =
PF
k=A !k ·Buildingsk,i,t
Populationi,t
, (2)
where !A = 0, !B = 0, !C = 0.5, !D = 0.5, !E = 1, !F = 1.14 The variable Damagesi,t captures both, the
severity and the extension of the damages. A higher score in the index can be determined either by a higher
number of buildings reporting damages or (conditional on a given number of buildings) by a higher number
of buildings reporting severe damages (categorized on a higher AeDES level).
Through the inclusion of fixed eﬀects we capture unobserved time invariant municipal characteristics. In
order to avoid collinearity issues between the variable Damagesi,t and yearly dummies we include a time
14Robustness checks (not reported in this version of the paper but available on request) show that our results are insensitive
to this choice.
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trend ( t) that controls for aggregate monetary and fiscal policies aﬀecting growth across all municipalities.15
Our choice to include a common time trend across municipalities is consistent with the evidence presented
in figure 4.16 Furthermore, our diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach addresses potential endogeneity problems
raised by the possibility that municipal-specific characteristics may be correlated with grants allocation
criteria. For instance, it may be possible that the central government systematically allocates more resources
in municipalities with output growth below the median in an attempt to boost it. Under this allocation rule
the coeﬃcient  1 would be downwardly biased while   would correctly capture the exogenous component of
grants.
Another possible source of endogeneity is represented by the variable Damagesi,t. The negative supply
shock captured with our index of damages might be either downwardly biased if municipalities with higher
per capita income report less damages because of an ex-ante lower vulnerability of the buildings, or upwardly
biased if municipalities with ex-ante higher output growth reported a higher ex-post index of damages due to
the higher per capita capital stock. We address this potential issue in two ways. First, we consider the rate of
growth of output as dependent variable instead of its level. Second, we instrument the variable Damagesi,t
relying on the strict exogeneity and randomness of the earthquake.17 As an instrument we use the inverse
of the distance of each municipality from the epicenter (variable Distancei,t).18 Given this instrument, our
estimates are unbiased under three conditions. First, the distance should be a good predictor of the damages.
Figure F.8 provides robust evidence in support of this hypothesis. Second, the distance and the stochastic
component of output growth should be uncorrelated, formally E("i.t|Distancei,t) = 0. Finally, the distance
should be uncorrelated with output growth (Yi,t) in order to satisfy the necessary exclusion restrictions
criteria, formally E(Yi.t|Distancei,t) = 0. Preliminary regressions show that the distance is indeed highly
15We specify a quadratic trend. This choice - instead of a linear trend - is driven by the observed U-shaped growth path
during the considered period. Specifying a linear trend instead of quadratic makes little (or no diﬀerence) on the estimated
parameters.
16The inclusion of individual-specific time trends makes no diﬀerence on the estimates. For this reason we prefer a more
conservative model with a common trend across municipalities.
17Abruzzo is the second most seismic region in Italy after Calabria. Virtually the entire territory is classified as "highly
seismic" by the INGV. Therefore, the ex-ante probability of an earthquake (meaning the ex-ante probability of a municipality
to be relatively close to the epicenter) is uniformly distributed across points in the region.
18The coordinates of the epicenter were determined by the INGV and they are as follows: latitude 42.295, longitude 13.628.
The distance is calculated using the municipal coordinates released by the national institute of statistics (typically the chosen
point is the center of the inhabited part of the municipal surface).
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correlated with the damages while it is not with output growth.
As regards the matrix of controlsXi,t we include three variables capturing the evolution of the population:
(i) total number of residents at December the 31th of each year, (ii) share of population younger than 14
years old, and (iii) share of population older than 65 years old (see AppendixD for details).
4. Data
Our dataset is a balanced panel of 305 municipalities over the period 2002 - 2011 for a total of 3,050
observations. All municipalities are located in the region of Abruzzo (see map in figure F.11). Our choice
eliminates 14 municipalities ranked at Mercalli V or V-VI in the neighborhood region of Lazio.19 However,
the earthquake did not generate Mercalli ranks higher than V-VI outside Abruzzo and no municipalities
qualified for reconstruction grants in Lazio. Also, our main dependent variable (GDP) is not available for
municipalities in Lazio because it is estimated only for southern regions. For this reason, we prefer to restrict
the attention to Abruzzo only and maximize the ex-ante similarity between control and treatment group.
As a measure of municipal economic activity we rely on four diﬀerent variables. Our main dependent
variable is the municipal value added (GDP ) commissioned by the European Union Commission to monitor
the development of the so-called European "zone 3". These estimates are based on the oﬃcial figures of
provincial value added released by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT ) decomposed according
to the sectoral composition of output at the municipal level.20 Given the possibility of measurement errors in
the dependent variable we consider three alternatives. As a first alternative we employ high-resolution data
on night lights intensity measured by satellites at night. These data come from the National Geophysical
Data Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce) and
it has been shown (Henderson et al. [7]) to proxy well for local economic activity.21 For our purposes we
19The municipalities are: "Accumoli", "Amatrice", "Antrodoco", "Borbona", "Borgo Velino", "Borgorose", "Castel
Sant’Angelo", "Cittaducale", "Cittareale", "Fiamignano", "Micigliano", "Pescoracchiano", "Petrella Salto" and "Posta", all
located in the province of Rieti.
20The Italian provinces are well defined political and geographical entities similar to the US counties. In Abruzzo there are
four provinces ("Chieti", "L’Aquila", "Pescara", and "Teramo") composed by an average of 76 municipalities each.
21The data are publicly available at: http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
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use the "Average Visible, Stable Lights, and Cloud Free" images taken from two satellites: F16 for the
years from 2004 to 2009 and F18 for 2010 and 2011. The luminosity of each municipality is calculated by
taking the average luminosity of all pixels corresponding to the surface of the municipality. Figure F.12
shows the average luminosity over night in 2007 for the municipalities in our sample while figure F.6 plots
the remarkably high correlation between the GDP growth rates and night luminosity growth rates across all
municipalities in the sample. As a final check, we collected data on other two alternative dependent variables:
total declared personal income (tax base of national personal income tax) and business income provided by
the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance. The first one refers to the sum of all declared personal incomes
in each municipality in each year and it oﬀers the advantage of reducing the possibility of measurement errors
due to fiscal evasion. The second one refers to the sum of all incomes generated by small and medium firms
and self-employed workers, therefore oﬀering an excellent proxy of economic activity.
Fiscal data come from the municipal budget accounts ("certificati di conto consuntivi") released by the
Italian Ministry of Interior.22 These data include disaggregated information on expenditures, revenues and
grants recorded on accrual bases. All monetary variables are deflated using the regional consumer price
index from ISTAT .23 Demographic variables and time invariant characteristics are taken from ISTAT .
We also include a set of political variables collected from the Ministry of the Interior such as municipal
turnover and voting patterns at regional elections, and political alignment of the local government with the
central government.24 A detailed description of all variables, sources and summary statistics is reported
in AppendixD. All earthquakes-related geophysical data (including Mercalli ranks) come from the Italian
National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology ("2011 Italian Macroseismic Database (DBMI11))";25
table F.13 reports the distribution of Mercalli ranks across all years for all recorded events showing that
the only major quake in the considered period is the one of interest in this paper. Finally, data on AeDES
classified buildings come from the CPD.
22Available at: http://finanzalocale.interno.it.
23All ISTAT data are available at: http://dati.istat.it/?lang=en.
24For the measure of the political orientation of each municipality, we take the results of regional election rather than the
results of municipal elections because the presence of local political parties which do not allow to unambiguously identify the
political orientation of the council. Instead, at regional elections voters choose among the same parties as in the general elections.
25Available at: http://emidius.mi.ingv.it/DBMI11/.
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5. Results
In this section, we discuss the results from our regression model. Table 2 reports the baseline results using
value added as dependent variable. There are 73 municipalities in the control group (52 with Mercalli rank V
and 21 with V-VI) and 43 in the treatment group (Mercalli VI). We run our baseline considering the period
2008-2011 for a total of 464 observations (116 municipalities, 4 years). The choice of the time span for the
baseline is determined by the necessity of maximizing the similarity of the institutional framework given the
2008 reform of grants allocation which followed the reform in the municipal property tax. In robustness checks
we extend both, the regression sample and the time dimension and show that our results are fully robust to
the sample structure. The first two columns of table 2 refer to the diﬀerence in diﬀerences model ("Model
1") while the remaining four columns ("Model 2") show the results instrumenting the Damagesi,t with the
Distancei,t (the last two columns of table 2 shows the first stage of the two-stage least squares estimation).
Each model contains two separate columns which diﬀer for the inclusions of demographic controls.
As reported in table 2, the one-year multiplier is statistically diﬀerent from zero at 1 percent level in
both model 1 and model 2, with point estimates respectively of 0.15 and 0.36. Considering model 2 as a
reference, this result suggests that an exogenous increase in reconstruction grants by 1 percent of local value
added determines a contemporaneous increase in local output of 0.36 percent. The variable Damagesi,t
enters in model 1 with the expected negative coeﬃcient. Once the damages are instrumented (model 2), the
coeﬃcient is significant at 1 percent level and the magnitude is higher than model 1 signaling endogeneity (the
point estimates of  ˆ average around -0.32). The upward bias in model 1 is determined by the fact that the
municipalities with ex-ante higher output growth reported a higher ex-post index of damages due to the higher
capital stock. Moreover, given that damages and grants are highly correlated, the bias in the point estimates
of  ˆ aﬀects also the estimates of  ˆ which exhibit a downward bias in model 1. As a result, the estimates of the
multiplier become more reliable after instrumenting the damages with the distance of each municipality from
the epicenter of the quake. Given that the mean of the index of damages is 0.11 in the regression sample,
the result from model 2 implies a negative eﬀect of the quake of around 3.7 percentage points on output
growth.26 Overall, given an average grants shock of 7.0 percent of local output in the regression sample, the
26The figure is calculated by multiplying 0.11 times 0.32.
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negative supply shock generated by the quake is entirely compensated by the countercyclical reconstruction
policies.
Table 2: Baseline results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.145** 0.146** 0.367*** 0.363*** 0.500*** 0.494***
[0.061] [0.061] [0.096] [0.094] [0.178] [0.178]
Damages -0.017 -0.023 -0.314*** -0.315*** - -
[0.046] [0.046] [0.086] [0.084]
Distance - - - - 1.544*** 1.547***
[0.429] [0.431]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.35 0.37 - - 0.66 0.66
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 14.7 15.1
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 71.9 72.3
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
This result is in line with the oﬃcial GDP estimates released by the Italian national institute of statistics
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(ISTAT ) at the provincial level according to which output growth in 2009 in the province of L’Aquila was
slightly higher than the national one despite the seismic event.27
The first stage reported in the last two columns of table 2 confirms two important priors. First, there
exists a very high correlation between Distancei,t and Damagesi,t (see figure F.8 for a graphical evidence).
The coeﬃcient of Distancei,t is significant at 1 percent level with point estimates around 1.55. Second, there
exists a very high correlation between reconstruction grants and the index of damages. The coeﬃcient of
Interactioni,t is significant at 1 percent level with point estimates at 0.50. The goodness of fit is satisfactory
in both models: the R2 is as high as 0.37 for model 2 while it increases to 0.66 in the first stage. Also,
the underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange multiplier statistic) and the weak identification test
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) confirm that our instrument is indeed a valid one. Finally, we provide
evidence that the "grants multiplier" can be interpreted as a "local spending multiplier" around the Mercalli
VI cutoﬀ. In table 3 we report the output elasticity estimated following the baseline and substituting the
grants with local spending (current plus capital municipal expenditure). Because around the cutoﬀ there is
no discontinuity in local tax revenues as shown in figure F.10, the coeﬃcient of the variable Interactioni,t in
table 3 is virtually identical to the baseline (0.33 versus 0.36) and therefore it can be interpreted as a "local
spending multiplier" net of marginal tax rebates.
27According to ISTAT output contracted by 5.5 percent in Italy in 2009. Not surprisingly, the contraction was bigger for
Abruzzo region (6.6 percent) given that traditionally the output performance of southern regions is lower than the corresponding
national one. However, output contracted only by 5.2 percent in the province of L’Aquila despite the seismic event.
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Table 3: Spending multiplier results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.108* 0.113* 0.332*** 0.331*** 0.511*** 0.509***
[0.063] [0.064] [0.098] [0.096] [0.179] [0.178]
Damages -0.013 -0.019 -0.307*** -0.308*** - -
[0.049] [0.050] [0.085] [0.082]
Distance - - - - 1.559*** 1.555***
[0.470] [0.461]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.35 0.37 - - 0.65 0.65
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 15.3 15.9
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 71.4 71.3
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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6. Robustness checks and further results
We compare our baseline results against a large set of robustness checks. In this section we explain the
set of checks and presents the results of these complementary regressions. For brevity, we present the checks
only of the baseline while the tables showing the corresponding checks for spending are virtually identical
and available upon request.
Diﬀerent bandwidth. As a first additional result we allow for a diﬀerent bandwidth with respect to the
baseline. The results of this check are shown in table B.5.28 We consider three alternative bandwidths. In the
first one (first two columns of the table) we consider a more restrictive bandwidth with respect to the baseline
and include only Mercalli V-VI and Mercalli VI for a total of 64 municipalities (21 in the control group and
43 in the treatment group). The multiplicative eﬀects of exogenous grants is significative at 1 percent level
with point estimates as high as 0.27 in the diﬀerence in diﬀerences model cum instrumental variables. Also
the variable Damagesi,t enters significantly at 1 percent level with the expected sign and a magnitude similar
to the one in the baseline. Similar results, presented in the two central columns of table B.5, emerge when
considering as a bandwidth all municipalities ranked between Mercalli V and Mercalli VI-VII (this choice
enlarges the number of municipalities used in the regressions to 122 for a total of 486 observations). The only
significant diﬀerence compared to the baseline emerges in the last three columns of table B.5 where we allow
in the regressions for all municipalities equal or above Mercalli V for a total of 130 municipalities.29 Given the
observed discontinuity in local taxes (figure F.10), in this case we introduce three extra variables in the model:
an additional treatment dummy that takes the value of 1 for municipalities ranked at or above Mercalli VII,
the per capita total tax revenues in each municipality and the interaction between the two. The coeﬃcient
of the interaction variable captures the output elasticity to an exogenous variation in the marginal tax rate
(driven by the property tax rate) net of variations of the tax base (captured by the variable Damagesi,t).
Therefore, the coeﬃcient of the new interaction variable can be interpreted as a "local tax multiplier". The
estimates reported in table B.5 remain in line with the baseline for the "grants multiplier" and for the index of
28In the last two models the number of observations is 486 rather 488 and 1212 rather then 1220 because 4 municipalities
are missing the 2010 and 2011 fiscal entries. The municipalities (all located in the province of L’Aquila) are: "Capistrello",
"Carapelle Calvisio", "Civitella Alfedena", and "Scontrone".
29The total number of observations in these regressions is 518 rather then 520 because the municipality of "Carapelle Calvisio"
did not report the budget data for 2010 and 2011.
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damages. However, the estimated "tax multiplier" is well above unity with point estimate at 2.5. Although
we rely on a robust identification strategy, this last result should be interpreted with caution given that
only eight municipalities are included in the additional treatment group (above Mercalli VII). However, this
estimate of the "local tax multiplier" is virtually the only empirical estimate at the local level in Italy.
Extending the time period. As a second exercise we check whether the time choice made in our
baseline is the driver of our results. In this check we progressively extend the time dimension of our panel
in order to maximize the number of observations included in the regressions. The results of this check are
reported in table B.6.30 The first three columns consider the period from 2006 to 2011 and we report the
results of model 1 (first column), model 2 (second column), and the first stage of model 2 (third column).
The same logic is applied to the remaining columns of the table that show the results when considering all
years included in our dataset (from 2002 to 2011). This last regression runs over 1,160 observations (116
municipalities over 10 years). Overall, the evidence emerging from table B.6 largely confirms our baseline.
All coeﬃcients in model 2 (including the first stage) remain significant at 1 percent level, the magnitude
of the estimates is in line with the baseline as well as the goodness of fit the models and the instrumental
variables tests.
Alternative dependent variable. As a third check we employ a set of diﬀerent dependent variables
as a measure of economic activity. The first alternative dependent variable that we consider is the average
night lights intensity over the year as recorded by satellite images. Because this variable is an indirect
measure of economic activity, we do not express the growth rate of real per capita grants as a ratio of the
lagged dependent variable. Rather, we express it as a ratio of its own lag
⇣
Git, =
gi,t gi,t 1
gi,t 1
⌘
. The results
of these regressions are shown in table B.7. The variables of interest enter with the expected sign and they
are significant at 1 percent level in model 2. The magnitude of  ˆ in this case cannot be interpreted as a
traditional multiplier given the definition of Gi,t. However, it is possible to recover the multiplier estimating
the average fiscal shock G¯t (0.47), the average change in night light intensity Y¯t (0.05), and the elasticity
between night lights change and output change (0.03). In our sample such multiplier is estimated at 0.35,
remarkably close to the baseline result. Furthermore, the goodness of fit of the models is significantly high
30In the last three columns the number of observations is 1,158 rather than 1,160 because the 2003 and 2004 fiscal data for
municipality of "Secinaro" are missing.
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as well as the instrumental variables tests are all well above the critical values. The other two alternative
dependent variables that we employ are total income and business income. We report the results of these
regressions respectively in table B.8 and B.9. Despite the fact that the source of these data is not the same as
for the previous regressions, we obtain very similar results compared to the baseline. The multiplier estimated
using total income is 0.21 and the variable Damagesi,t is significant at 1 percent level. However, employing
business income as dependent variable confirms the baseline in two dimensions (despite the lower number of
observations): the level of significance of grants and the sign of the damages, although the magnitude of the
latter is higher than in the baseline.31
Placebo. As third check we run a placebo experiment. Because Mercalli ranks between I and V were not
assigned, we compare Mercalli 0 ranked municipalities with Mercalli V assuming the former as control group
and the latter as treatment group. In this case the regression sample is composed by 227 municipalities out
of which 175 in the control group and 52 in the treatment and the variable Di,t is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 for Mercalli V and 0 for Mercalli 0. We report the results of these regressions in table B.10.32 The
evidence confirms our baseline since none of the coeﬃcient of interests ( ˆ and  ˆ) are significant. Also, in
model 1 the variable Damagesi,t enters with the wrong coeﬃcient as does the distance in the first stage of
model 2.
Errors robust to clusters. As a fourth check we allow for errors robust to geographical clusters. As
is well known, inference in panel estimation can be highly misleading if there is spatial correlation within
groups of observations (Bertrand et al. [4]). Following a common approach in the literature, in this check our
inference is based on standard errors robust to clusters, allowing for individual clusters (therefore maximizing
the possible number of clusters). Our results are reported in table B.11 and they confirm the baseline since
all coeﬃcients remain significant at 1 percent level.
31The lower number of observations is due to missing values in the data from the Ministry of Interior due to "privacy issues".
32The total number of observations in table B.10 is 902 rather than 908 (= 227 times 4) since three municipalities have not
reported the budgets for 2010 and 2011. The three municipalities (all located in the province of L’Aquila and all reporting a
Mercalli 0 in 2009) are: "Capistrello", "Civitella Alfedena", and "Scontrone".
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7. Conclusion
In this paper we have contributed evidence of local fiscal multipliers. By relying on a natural event in
Italy, we estimated the output eﬀect generated by the event, as a result of two combined shocks, the negative
supply shock due to the quake, and the positive demand shock driven by reconstruction grants. Using a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences cum instrumental variables analysis we have shown non negligible output eﬀects of
negative supply shocks. In our estimates, the output loss from the quake averages 3.7 percentage points.
Also, we estimated the "grants multipliers" as high as 0.36. Spending multipliers net of marginal tax rebates
are estimated virtually identical to grants multipliers while tax multipliers net of variations in the tax base
are well above unity.
The policy relevance of quantifying local fiscal multipliers is apparent. On one hand, we shed light to
the extent to which fiscal tools can alleviate the output loss generated by large idyosinchratic shocks like
earthquakes. On the other hand, this paper analyzes the optimality of the institutional rule used to allocate
grants after the event. Regarding the first factor we showed that reconstruction grants eﬀectively provided
public insurance following the event preventing output from falling below trend. However, the multiplicative
eﬀects on economic activity are heterogenous across fiscal instruments: the grants and spending multipliers
are estimated below unity while the tax multiplier is well above one suggesting the most eﬀective instrument
to stimulate growth following a natural disaster. Regarding the second factor, our study pointed out that
the grants allocation rule used after the 2009 "Aquilano" quake based on a discontinuous scale might not
be optimal since it translated into significant geographical variations in economic activity across neighbor
municipalities with similar damages. In this dimension, a grants allocation based on a combination between
a discontinuous variables such as the Mercalli scale and a continuos variable such as the distance from the
epicenter could provide a more equitable and eﬃcient distribution of grants.
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Appendix
AppendixA. Are the Mercalli ranks artificially manipulated?
Given our identification strategy, a natural concern about the Mercalli ranks is whether they eﬀectively
reflect the damages suﬀered by each municipality or whether they are artificially manipulated. This would
happen if, for instance, the delegates assigned higher ranks to poorer municipalities or to municipalities in
which the mayor belongs to the same political party of the central government. In this way reconstruction
grants would be endogenous to political or economic cycles.
We test this hypothesis using a probit model estimated by maximum-likelihood. Our goal is to test
whether the decision of classifying a municipality as Mercalli VI instead of V was based on the recorded
damages only or was influenced by other factors (although the qualifying threshold was ex ante unknown to
the delegates).33 The empirical model is
DM i = ↵+  Damagesi +  
0
Zi +  
0
Xi + ⌘i. (A.1)
where DMi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for Mercalli VI and zero for V or V-VI, Zi is
a matrix containing the other variables of interest (municipal output, municipal unemployment rate, and
political alignment with the central government since reconstruction grants come almost exclusively from
the central government), Xi is a matrix that contains all other controls,   and   are vectors of coeﬃcients,
and ⌘i is a disturbance term.34 We are interested in testing whether   or any of the coeﬃcients in   are
significantly diﬀerent from zero. As a proxy of political "allignment" of each municipality with the central
government, we take the results of the previous regional election.35
Our results are shown in table A.4. We consider four models with an increasing number of regressors and
controls.
33We assume that each building was correctly categorized following the AeDES system. This assumption is reinforced by the
fact that the owner of the building is typically allowed to ask for a double check if the AeDES level is somehow controversial.
34The list of controls used in this regression is as follows (see AppendixD for definitions and sources): unemployment,
alignment, population band, graduates, unliterary, altimetry, altimetrymax, altimetrymin, urbanization, surface, coast, family,
foreigners, commuters, head, left, buildings19, buildings45, buildings61, buildings71, buildings81, buildings91, buildingspost91.
35We take the results of the previous regional election rather than the results of municipal elections because the huge hetero-
geneity of local political parties who run for mayoral elections do not allow us to identify the political orientation of the council.
Instead, at regional elections voters choose among the very same parties as in the general elections.
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Table A.4: Probit analysis results.
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Damages 5.327*** 24.350*** 5.263*** 23.770**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDP 0.000 0.000
[0.944] [0.549]
Unemployment -0.028 -0.054
[0.492] [0.546]
Alignment 0.016 0.011
[0.161] [0.603]
Controls YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 116 116 116 116
Log likelihood -55.39 -25.94 -54.07 -25.33
P-values in brackets. ⇤⇤⇤ significant at 1%, ⇤⇤ at 5% and ⇤ at 10%.
The only variable with some explanatory power is the index of damages.36 All other regressors, including
municipal output, municipal unemployment rate and political alignment are not statistically diﬀerent from
zero. We take this result as an evidence that the Mercalli ranks reflect only the damages generated by
the earthquake (additional evidence on the exogeneity of Mercalli ranks is provided by Porcelli and Trezzi
[10]). Finally, because the coeﬃcients in a probit model do not provide direct measure of the partial eﬀect,
we estimate the marginal eﬀect of the variable Damagesi keeping all other variables at their mean levels.
The marginal eﬀect is reported in figure A.5. Visibly, the index of damages alone is able to increase the
probability of receiving reconstruction grants to 1 for values slightly below 0.3. A yellow vertical line reports
the average value of damages (0.25) at Mercalli VI which is associated with a marginal probability non
statistically diﬀerent from 1 indicating that the damages alone - and no other variables - can explain whether
36Very similar results are obtained when allowing for the distance as a regressor instead of the damages.
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a municipality qualifies or not for reconstruction grants.
Figure A.5: Marginal probability - Damages variable.
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Table B.5: Diﬀerent bandwidth results.
V-VI to VI V to VI-VII Equal or higher than V
DiD DiD + IV First stage DiD DiD + IV First stage DiD DiD + IV First stage
Interaction grants 0.139** 0.268*** 0.484*** 0.156** 0.441*** 0.695*** 0.108** 0.325*** 0.721***
[0.066] [0.076] [0.190] [0.062] [0.116] [0.179] [0.045] [0.084] [0.127]
Interaction taxes - - - - - - -0.673 -2.559** 0.061
[0.738] [1.006] [0.042]
Damages -0.018 -0.192*** - -0.010 -0.315*** - -0.004 -0.246*** -
[0.051] [0.065] [0.030] [0.086] [0.030] [0.077]
Distance - - 1.577*** - - 1.175*** - - 1.125***
[0.548] [0.362] [0.346]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 256 256 256 486 486 486 518 518 518
R2 0.42 - 0.67 0.38 - 0.71 0.40 - 0.77
Underidentification test - 15.4 - 17.5 - 20.0
Weak identification test - 33.3 - 49.5 - 49.1
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table B.6: Diﬀerent time selection results.
2006 to 2011 2002 to 2011
DiD DiD + IV First stage DiD DiD + IV First stage
Interaction 0.101* 0.330*** 0.504*** 0.097* 0.432*** 0.538***
[0.055] [0.096] [0.187] [0.053] [0.131] [0.187]
Damages -0.038 -0.337*** - -0.046 -0.466*** -
[0.049] [0.086] [0.051] [0.118]
Distance - - 1.523*** - - 1.492***
[0.419] [0.415]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 696 696 696 1158 1158 1158
R2 0.25 - 0.66 0.19 - 0.66
Underidentification test - 14.7 - - 13.9
Weak identification test - 124.7 - - 223.7
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table B.7: Night lights intensity as dependent variable.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.072** -0.003 -0.003
[0.016] [0.016] [0.028] [0.029] [0.011] [0.011]
Damages -0.045 -0.060 -1.850*** -1.886*** - -
[0.071] [0.072] [0.489] [0.486]
Distance - - - - 2.024*** 2.021***
[0.501] [0.495]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.53 0.54 - - 0.60 0.61
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 16.2 16.7
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 115.7 115.4
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table B.8: Income as dependent variable results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.130 0.129 0.225* 0.215 0.757*** 0.749***
[0.099] [0.098] [0.134] [0.133] [0.198] [0.200]
Damages -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.208*** -0.199*** - -
[0.039] [0.040] [0.077] [0.077]
Distance - - - - 1.503*** 1.508***
[0.412] [0.422]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.31 0.32 - - 0.67 0.67
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 16.1 16.6
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 73.4 73.8
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table B.9: Business income as dependent variable results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.012** 0.012** 0.038* 0.042* 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.022] [0.022] [0.000] [0.000]
Damages -2.798** -2.721** -7.580* -8.157** - -
[1.074] [1.072] [4.155] [4.149]
Distance - - - - 0.274*** 0.272***
[0.082] [0.087]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 215 215 215 215 215 215
R2 0.32 0.32 - - 0.97 0.97
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 9.2 8.9
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 15.1 14.4
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table B.10: Placebo test results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction -0.105 -0.089 1.124 1.112 0.276 0.275
[0.216] [0.214] [1.134] [1.104] [0.197] [0.198]
Damages 0.126* 0.116* -2.434 -2.393 - -
[0.066] [0.064] [2.157] [2.098]
Distance - - - - -0.002 -0.001
[0.026] [0.025]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 902 902 902 902 902 902
R2 0.46 0.48 - - 0.31 0.15
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 0.0 0.0
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 0.0 0.0
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table B.11: Clusters results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.145** 0.146** 0.367*** 0.363*** 0.500*** 0.494***
[0.061] [0.061] [0.096] [0.095] [0.195] [0.194]
Damages -0.017 -0.023 -0.314*** -0.315*** - -
[0.046] [0.046] [0.091] [0.088]
Distance - - - - 1.544*** 1.547***
[0.486] [0.488]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.35 0.37 - - 0.65 0.66
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 11.4 11.8
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 71.9 72.3
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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AppendixC. Mercalli scale
The Richter scale (or simply "magnitude") was invented by Charles Francis Richter at the California
Institute of Technology. It quantifies the energy released during an earthquake on a base-10 logarithmic
scale. For instance, an earthquake that measures 5.0 on the Richter scale has a shaking amplitude 10 times
larger than one that measures 4.0, and corresponds to a 31.6 times larger release of energy. Technically, the
magnitude is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the amplitude of waves measured by a seismograph to
an arbitrary small amplitude. However, before seismologists were able to measure the moment-magnitude of
earthquakes, other scales were invented to categorize seismic episodes. In 1783 an Italian architect (Pompeo
Schiantarelli) invented a rudimentary scale to classify the aﬀected regions according to the severity of the
damages. The scale underwent several revisions and it is now known as ’Mercalli scale’, from the Italian
volcanologist Giuseppe Mercalli who modified it in 1908. The scale is a narrative description of the damages
defined on twelve levels ranging from ’instrumental’ (I) to ’catastrophic’ (XII). Here below we report the
definitions of each level.
• I Instrumental People: Not felt except by a very few people under exceptionally favorable circum-
stances.
• II Weak People: Felt by persons at rest, on upper floors or favorably placed.
• III Slight People: Felt indoors, hanging objects may swing, vibration similar to passing of light
trucks,duration may be estimated, may not be recognized as an earthquake.
• IV Moderate People: Generally noticed indoors but not outside. Light sleepers may be awakened.
Vibration may be likened to the passing of heavy traﬃc, or to the jolt of a heavy object falling or
striking the building. Fittings: Doors and windows rattle. Glassware and crockery rattle. Liquids in
open vessels may be slightly disturbed. Standing motorcars may rock. Structures: Walls and frames of
buildings, and partitions and suspended ceilings in commercial buildings, may be heard to creak.
• V Rather Strong People: Generally felt outside, and by almost everyone indoors. Most sleepers
awakened. A few people alarmed. Fittings: Small unstable objects are displaced or upset. Some
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glassware and crockery may be broken. Hanging pictures knock against the wall. Open doors may
swing. Cupboard doors secured by magnetic catches may open. Pendulum clocks stop, start, or change
rate. Structures: Some windows Type I cracked. A few earthenware toilet fixtures cracked.
• VI Strong People: Felt by all. People and animals alarmed. Many run outside. Diﬃculty experienced
in walking steadily. Fittings: Objects fall from shelves. Pictures fall from walls. Some furniture moved
on smooth floors, some unsecured free-standing fireplaces moved. Glassware and crockery broken.
Very unstable furniture overturned. Small church and school bells ring. Appliances move on bench or
table tops. Filing cabinets or "easy glide" drawers may open (or shut). Structures: Slight damage to
Buildings Type I. Some stucco or cement plaster falls. Windows Type I broken. Damage to a few weak
domestic chimneys, some may fall. Environment: Trees and bushes shake, or are heard to rustle. Loose
material may be dislodged from sloping ground, e.g. existing slides, talus slopes, shingle slides.
• VII Very Strong People: General alarm. Diﬃculty experienced in standing. Noticed by motorcar
drivers who may stop. Fittings: Large bells ring. Furniture moves on smooth floors, may move on
carpeted floors. Substantial damage to fragile contents of buildings. Structures: Unreinforced stone
and brick walls cracked. Buildings Type I cracked with some minor masonry falls. A few instances of
damage to Buildings Type II. Unbraced parapets, unbraced brick gables, and architectural ornaments
fall. Roofing tiles, especially ridge tiles may be dislodged. Many unreinforced domestic chimneys
damaged, often falling from roof-line. Water tanks Type I burst. A few instances of damage to brick
veneers and plaster or cement-based linings. Unrestrained water cylinders (water tanks Type II) may
move and leak. Some windows Type II cracked. Suspended ceilings damaged. Environment: Water
made turbid by stirred up mud. Small slides such as falls of sand and gravel banks, and small rock-
falls from steep slopes and cuttings. Instances of settlement of unconsolidated or wet, or weak soils.
Some fine cracks appear in sloping ground. A few instances of liquefaction (i.e. small water and sand
ejections).
• VIII Destructive People: Alarm may approach panic. Steering of motorcars greatly aﬀected. Struc-
tures: Buildings Type I heavily damaged, some collapse. Buildings Type II damaged, some with partial
collapse. Buildings Type III damaged in some cases. A few instances of damage to Structures Type IV.
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Monuments and pre-1976 elevated tanks and factory stacks twisted or brought down. Some pre-1965
infill masonry panels damaged. A few post-1980 brick veneers damaged. Decayed timber piles of houses
damaged. Houses not secured to foundations may move. Most unreinforced domestic chimneys dam-
aged, some below roof-line, many brought down. Environment: Cracks appear on steep slopes and in
wet ground. Small to moderate slides in roadside cuttings and unsupported excavations. Small water
and sand ejections and localized lateral spreading adjacent to streams, canals, lakes, etc.
• IX Violent Structures: Many Buildings Type I destroyed. Buildings Type II heavily damaged, some
collapse. Buildings Type III damaged, some with partial collapse. Structures Type IV damaged in
some cases, some with flexible frames seriously damaged. Damage or permanent distortion to some
Structures Type V. Houses not secured to foundations shifted oﬀ. Brick veneers fall and expose frames.
Environment: Cracking of ground conspicuous. Land sliding general on steep slopes. Liquefaction
eﬀects intensified and more widespread, with large lateral spreading and flow sliding adjacent to streams,
canals, lakes, etc.
• X Intense Structures: Most Buildings Type I destroyed. Many Buildings Type II destroyed. Buildings
Type III heavily damaged, some collapse. Structures Type IV damaged, some with partial collapse.
Structures Type V moderately damaged, but few partial collapses. A few instances of damage to
Structures Type VI. Some well-built timber buildings moderately damaged (excluding damage from
falling chimneys). Environment: Land sliding very widespread in susceptible terrain, with very large
rock masses displaced on steep slopes. Landslide dams may be formed. Liquefaction eﬀects widespread
and severe.
• XI Extreme Structures: Most Buildings Type II destroyed. Many Buildings Type III destroyed.
Structures Type IV heavily damaged, some collapse. Structures Type V damaged, some with partial
collapse. Structures Type VI suﬀer minor damage, a few moderately damaged.
• XII Catastrophic Structures: Most Buildings Type III destroyed. Structures Type IV heavily dam-
aged, some collapse. Structures Type V damaged, some with partial collapse. Structures Type VI
suﬀer minor damage, a few moderately damaged.
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Construction types. Buildings Type I: Buildings with low standard of workmanship, poor mortar, or
constructed of weak materials like mud brick or rammed earth. Soft storey structures (e.g. shops) made
of masonry, weak reinforced concrete or composite materials (e.g. some walls timber, some brick) not well
tied together. Masonry buildings otherwise conforming to buildings Types I to III, but also having heavy
unreinforced masonry towers. (Buildings constructed entirely of timber must be of extremely low quality
to be Type I.). Buildings Type II: Buildings of ordinary workmanship, with mortar of average quality. No
extreme weakness, such as inadequate bonding of the corners, but neither designed nor reinforced to resist
lateral forces. Such buildings not having heavy unreinforced masonry towers. Buildings Type III: Reinforced
masonry or concrete buildings of good workmanship and with sound mortar, but not formally designed to
resist earthquake forces. Structures Type IV: Buildings and bridges designed and built to resist earthquakes
to normal use standards, i.e. no special collapse or damage limiting measures taken (mid-1930s to c. 1970
for concrete and to c. 1980 for other materials). Structures Type V: Buildings and bridges, designed and
built to normal use standards, i.e. no special damage limiting measures taken, other than code requirements,
dating from since c. 1970 for concrete and c. 1980 for other materials. Structures Type VI: Structures,
dating from c. 1980, with well-defined foundation behavior, which have been specially designed for minimal
damage, e.g. seismically isolated emergency facilities, some structures with dangerous or high contents, or
new generation low damage structures. Windows. Type I: Large display windows, especially shop windows.
Type II: Ordinary sash or casement windows. Water tanks. Type I: External, stand mounted, corrugated
iron tanks. Type II: Domestic hot-water cylinders unrestrained except by supply and delivery pipes.
AppendixD. Description of variables in the dataset
AppendixD.1. Population controls
Population: total number of residents at December the 31th of each year. Source: Italian National In-
stitute of Statistics (ISTAT ). Migration: total net migration eﬀect (immigrants minus emigrants). Source:
ISTAT. Balance: natural balance (births minus deaths). Source: ISTAT. Population14: share of popu-
lation younger than 14 years old. Source: ISTAT. Population65: share of population older than 65 years
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old. Source: ISTAT
AppendixD.2. Political controls
Alignment: number of votes in favor of the center-left coalition at the regional elections as a share of
total votes. Source: Ministry of Interior.
AppendixD.3. Time invariant controls
Unemployment: number of unemployed people as a share of working labor force. Source: ISTAT.
Population band. Number of residents (1 = small town, 8= large city). Source: ISTAT. Graduates:
number of graduates as a share of total residents. Source: ISTAT. Unliteracy: rate of unliterary per
thousand habitants. Source: ISTAT. Altimetry: average altimetry expressed on a discrete scale from
1 (high) to 5 (low). Source: ISTAT. Altimetrymax: maximum altimetry in meters. Source: ISTAT.
Altimetrymin: minimum altimetry in meters. Source: ISTAT. Urbanization: degree of urbanization,
measured on a discrete scale from 1 (low) to 3 (high). Source: ISTAT. Surface: geographical surface
expressed in kilometers squared. Source: ISTAT. Coast: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the
municipality is on the coast. Source: ISTAT. Family: average number of people per family. Source: ISTAT.
Foreigners: number of non-italian residents as a share of total population. Source: ISTAT. Commuters:
number of working commuters as a share of total population. Source: ISTAT. Head: dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if the municipality is the political head of a province. Source: ISTAT. Buildings19:
share of buildings built before 1919. Source: ISTAT. Buildings45: share of buildings built before 1945.
Source: ISTAT. Buildings61: share of buildings built before 1961. Source: ISTAT. Buildings71: share
of buildings built before 1971. Source: ISTAT. Buildings81: share of buildings built before 1981. Source:
ISTAT. Buildings91: share of buildings built before 1991. Source: ISTAT. Buildingspost91: share of
buildings built after 1919. Source: ISTAT.
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AppendixE. List of municipalities in control and treatment group
Prov. of Chieti - control: Chieti (V), Fara Filiorum Petri (V), Filetto (V), San Giovanni Teatino (V),
Villa Santa Maria (V). Prov. of L’Aquila - control: Campo di Giove (V), Sulmona (V), Canistro (V),
Cansano (V), Anversa degli Abruzzi (V), Prezza (V), Pacentro (V), Tagliacozzo (V), Magliano de’ Marsi (V),
Vittorito (V), Ortona dei Marsi (V), Scanno (V), Roccacasale (V), Rocca Pia (V), San Benedetto dei Marsi
(V), Avezzano (V), Gioia dei Marsi (V), Lecce nei Marsi (V), Pettorano sul Gizio (V), Massa d’Albe (V),
Opi (V), Introdacqua (V), Raiano (V), Pescina (V), Calascio (V), Collepietro (V-VI), Aielli (V-VI), Secinaro
(V-VI), Molina Aterno (V-VI), Pratola Peligna (V-VI), Celano (V-VI), Scurcola Marsicana (V-VI), Cerchio
(V-VI), San Benedetto in Perillis (V-VI), Corfinio (V-VI). Prov. of L’Aquila - treatment: Acciano
(VI), Barete (VI), Barisciano (VI), Bugnara (VI), Cagnano Amiterno (VI), Campotosto (VI), Capestrano
(VI), Capitignano (VI), Caporciano (VI), Castel del Monte (VI), Castelvecchio Calvisio (VI), Cocullo (VI),
Collarmele (VI), Fagnano Alto (VI), Fontecchio (VI), Gagliano Aterno (VI), Montereale (VI), Navelli (VI),
Ocre (VI), Ofena (VI), Ovindoli (VI), Pizzoli (VI), Rocca di Cambio (VI), Rocca di Mezzo (VI), San Pio
delle Camere (VI), Scoppito (VI), Tornimparte (VI), Villa Santa Lucia degli Abruzzi (VI), Carapelle Calvisio
(VI-VII), Castel di Ieri (VI-VII), Lucoli (VI-VII), Prata d’Ansidonia (VI-VII), San Demetrio ne’ Vestini
(VI-VII), Santo Stefano di Sessanio (VI-VII), Castelvecchio Subequo (VII), Goriano Sicoli (VII), Tione degli
Abruzzi (VII), Fossa (VII-VIII), L’Aquila (VIII-IX), Poggio Picenze (VIII-IX), Sant’Eusanio Forconese (IX),
Villa Sant’Angelo (IX). Prov. of Pescara - control: Bolognano (V), Catignano (V), Cepagatti (V),
Civitaquana (V), Corvara (V), Farindola (V), Loreto Aprutino (V), Manoppello (V), Nocciano (V), Penne
(V), Pescosansonesco (V), Rosciano (V), Scafa (V), Vicoli (V), Villa Celiera (V), Alanno (V-VI), Carpineto
della Nora (V-VI), Castiglione a Casauria (V-VI), Pianella (V-VI), Pietranico (V-VI), Tocco da Casauria (V-
VI). Prov. of Pescara - treatment: Brittoli (VI), Bussi sul Tirino (VI), Civitella Casanova (VI), Cugnoli
(VI), Montebello di Bertona (VI), Popoli (VI), Torre de’ Passeri (VI). Prov. of Teramo - control: Bisenti
(V), Cellino Attanasio (V), Cortino (V), Crognaleto (V), Rocca Santa Maria (V), Teramo (V), Torricella
Sicura (V), Valle Castellana (V), Basciano (V-VI), Castel Castagna (V-VI), Cermignano (V-VI), Isola del
Gran Sasso d’Italia (V-VI). Prov. of Teramo - treatment: Arsita (VI), Castelli (VI), Colledara (VI),
Fano Adriano (VI), Montorio al Vomano (VI), Penna Sant’Andrea (VI), Pietracamela (VI), Tossicia (VI).
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AppendixF. Descriptive statistics and complementary figures
Table F.12: Distribution of Mercalli ranks across provinces in 2009.
Mercalli rank Chieti L’Aquila Pescara Teramo Total
0 99 31 18 27 175
V 4 25 15 8 52
V-VI 1 10 6 4 21
VI 0 28 7 8 43
VI-VII 0 6 0 0 6
VII 0 3 0 0 3
VII-VIII 0 1 0 0 1
VIII 0 0 0 0 0
VIII-IX 0 2 0 0 2
IX 0 2 0 0 2
Total 104 108 46 47 305
Figure F.6: Output change - Lights intensity change.
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Table F.14: Summary Statistics (regression sample)
All Control (V and V-VI) Treatment (VI and VI-VII)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
GDP 13,274 6,472 4,915 77,014 13,342 5,263 6357 47,128 12,962 4,277 6,414 27,227
Total income 13,106 2,237 7,582 21,454 13,119 2,354 7970 19,934 13,201 2,503 7,582 20,468
Business income 334 734 0 8,252 352 609 6 32,06 105 86 0 450
Night lights intensity 16.1 12.4 1.9 62.3 15.0 10.8 1.9 60.0 9.7 5.0 3.2 29.4
Grants 534 1,019 0 21,300 439 727 0 14,054 990 1341 33 9,313
Local expenditure 1,748 1,873 77 25,954 1,594 1,876 77 25,754 2,476 2,006 559 15,674
Local tax revenues 1,955 643 868 7,149 1,927 759 1003 4,096 2,236 775 890 5,160
Population 4,301 10,589 77 123,077 4,778 10,085 120 56,127 1,460 1,522 141 8,283
Pop under 14 12.3 3.0 1.3 26.5 12.5 2.8 1.3 21.3 10.9 3.2 2.1 18.7
Pop over 65 26.6 9.4 7.3 86.4 26.3 8.5 11.9 63.0 30.6 10.2 12.8 67.3
Unemployment 10.1 3.8 0 28.8 10.5 3.8 4.5 23.2 10.2 3.5 0 23.0
Left 50.4 13.1 5.6 91.4 50.0 12.7 15.6 91.4 51.5 12.5 21.8 79.0
Distance⇤ 45.9 21.8 2.5 95.2 33.2 10.9 6.7 70.9 21.7 10.4 2.7 40.5
Index of damages⇤ 0.07 0.20 0 1.40 0.02 0.09 0 0.64 0.27 0.27 0.01 1.06
No. of observations 3,050 730 430
⇤refers to 2009 only.
Other statistics availble upon request.
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Table F.13: Distribution of Mercalli ranks across years.
Mercalli 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
0 136 160 172 246 247 305 305 175 305 305 2,356
I 3 96 82 58 48 0 0 0 0 0 287
II 3 10 8 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 23
II-III 4 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
III 10 10 4 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 29
III-IV 29 16 12 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 60
IV 44 2 9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 56
IV-V 54 4 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68
V 22 1 4 0 0 0 0 52 0 0 79
V-VI 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 22
VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 43
VI-VII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 6
VII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
VII-VIII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
VIII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VIII-IX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
IX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Total 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 3,050
Note: Mercalli ranks before 2009 refer to the following events: "Subappennino Dauno" (November 1st 2002, magnitude 5.72, epicenter in "Molise"
region), "Zona Ascoli Piceno" (May 25th 2003, magnitude 4.30, epicenter in "Marche" region), "Molise" (June 1st 2003, magnitude 4.66, epicenter
in "Molise" region), "Monti dei Frentani" (December 30th 2003, magnitude 4.63, epicenter in "Molise" region), "Monti Tiburtini" (October 5th
2004, magnitude 4.05, epicenter in "Lazio" region), "Zona Teramo" (December 9th 2004, magnitude 4.54, epicenter in "Abruzzo" region), "Monti
dei Frentani" (March 1st 2005, magnitude 4.24, epicenter "Marche" region), "Maceratese" (April 12th 2005, magnitude 4.24, epicenter in "Marche"
region), "Valle del Topino" (December 15th 2005, magnitude 4.69, epicenter in "Marche" region), "Maceratese" (April 10th 2006, magnitude 4.55,
epicenter "Marche" region), and "Promontorio del Gargano" (May 29th 2006, magnitude 4.92, epicenter in "Puglia" region).
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Figure F.7: Index of damages - Mercalli ranks.
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Figure F.8: Index of damages - distance.
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Figure F.9: Discontinuity in expenditures (bandwidth 0.2).
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Figure F.10: Discontinuity in tax revenues (bandwidth 0.2).
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Figure F.11: Map of Italian regions.
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Figure F.12: Map of night lights intensity (average of 2007).
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